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A Response to Fr. Anthony Gittins, 
C.S.Sp.
I am pleased to be part of this lecture experience. Fr. 
Gittins brings to this community an extraordinary body of 
scholarship.1 His ideas are important for the Spiritans, this 
university community, and the West in general; his thoughtful 
analysis offers a corrective for the West. Fr. Gittins moves us 
from singularity of commitment and locality into pragmatic 
admission that having at least two different “habits of the heart” 
assists in texturing individual discernment and communal 
direction.2  
Fr. Gittins articulates the importance of geographical 
and social mobility; he frames a practical rationale for 
bicultural perspectives in community. He speaks otherwise 
than cosmopolitanism, the popular emphasis that invokes a 
modern sentiment of standing above and apart from the often 
problematic complexity of our human sociality. Fr. Gittins 
offers a practical embodied alternative—engaged bicultural 
understanding. He examines the challenge of singularity of 
perspective within religious communities with an emphasis 
on pragmatic bicultural insight. Fr. Gittins takes us into a 
world of embodied learning and comprehension via a stance 
of multiplicity. Fr. Gittin’s enriched conception of community 
is akin to that of Maurice Friedman, who was the principal 
interpreter and biographer of Martin Buber. Friedman 
differentiated between a community of otherness and a community 
of affinity. For Friedman, a community of affinity is based 
on psychological liking whereas a community of otherness is 
centered on learning from others, even those we do not like. 
Friedman’s understanding of a community of otherness assumes 
Buber’s emphasis on a “common center” that pulls difference 
together. A commitment to a common center permits one to 
assist those with whom one is in disagreement. A community 
of otherness requires love for a communal common center that 
is greater than one’s relational liking of persons within what 
Friedman termed a community of affinity.3 In a thoughtful and 
practical fashion, Fr. Gittins outlines how one can biculturally 
embrace and contribute to a community of otherness. 
Fr. Gittins calls for an intentional movement toward 
intercultural communities constituted in practical bicultural 
obligations. Again, in the language of Friedman, he provides a 
vision of a community of otherness constituted not in mystical 
demands, but in practical application of a twenty-first century 
faith. Fr. Gittin’s conception of community brings both 
Friedman and Buber into the story with Buber’s definition 
of community functioning as a contrast to psychological or 
...having at least two 
different “habits of the 
heart” assists in texturing 
individual discernment and 
communal direction.  
D r.  R o n a l d  C .  A r n e t t
H o r i z o n s
75
liking-based conceptions of community. A community of 
otherness gathered around a common center requires protection 
and promotion of a good that is performatively enacted in life 
together.4 Love of and commitment to the common center of a 
community requires giving part of one’s life to the maintenance, 
duration, and prospering of what gathers a community of 
persons together, even when one would prefer the absence of 
particular members.  
Fr. Gittins reminds us of a practical common center for 
the individual as well as the community: a multiplicity of 
perspectives. He frames the importance of bicultural knowledge 
and practices within any given person; such practices permit 
a twenty-first century manifestation of Immanuel Kant’s 
notion of self-dialogue.5 Kant discussed the necessity of 
internal dialogue in his conception of the first stage of decision 
making and judgment. Kant’s ethical system of self-legislation 
necessitates an initial encounter of differing positions within 
oneself. Fr. Gittins’s bicultural orientation assists self-dialogue 
and self-legislation; one’s ideas and positions must pass the 
test of self-examination before bringing them into the public 
domain of a given community. Cultural diversity begins within 
oneself, with a human being permitting different formative 
cultures to meet in interior dialogue—the first dialogue is with 
oneself, and for Fr. Gittins, that dialogue is bicultural. 
Fr. Gittins contends that becoming truly cross-cultural 
requires linguistic skill in another language and patience with 
the cultural “other” who might naturally be slow to offer 
welcome. It takes time to learn about another and his/her 
culture, let alone to begin to embody elements of a new cultural 
perspective. Time spent in meeting and interacting with others 
cannot be truncated; otherwise, we attempt to “overrun [the] 
reality” of social and cultural knowledge. Buber writes:
The real essence of community is to be found 
in the fact—manifest or otherwise—that it has 
a center. The real beginning of a community 
is when its members have a common relation 
to the center overriding all other relations: the 
circle is described by the radii, not the points 
along its circumference.6
Caution abides within a resistive impulse to overrun reality 
in the acquisition of bicultural acceptance. 
Fr. Gittins reminds us that groups demanding immediate 
assimilation discover limited success; such demands can lead 
to communicative acts of seduction with a managed smile 
of insincerity and, at times, the imposition of what Buber 
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termed neurotic guilt. While access to the public goods of 
society requires the demand of law, communities depend upon 
sentiments of inclusion over time. Communities of assimilation 
are modern creatures of amalgamation. They represent 
modernity at its height because modernity offers processes and 
procedures that attempt to eliminate differences. 
Uniting the insights of Sissela Bok and Buber’s 
understanding of common center, the points of common 
connection within a community require minimalist agreement. 
By this continuum, a minimal common center permits change 
and a maximal common center moves to ideological rigidity. 
Abiding by Aristotle’s description of the dangers of excess and 
deficiency, there are two extreme points of error. First, one can 
enact a willingness to discount the importance of a common 
center. Second, one can require maximal adherence to a center, 
a consistency that morphs into dangerous ideology. Bok’s 
minimalist conception illuminates a performative “how” in 
the engagement of diversity in a postmodern world. Alasdair 
MacIntyre offers a portrait of a postmodern world7 as a place 
of constant tension between and among differing virtue and 
narrative structures. MacIntyre thus suggests a conception of 
community that embraces a minimalistic common center that is 
vitally robust and publicly announced in daily practices within 
a community.
MacIntyre reminds us that communities can bring together 
different cultures and at the same time unite them on common 
narrative grounds.8 People require narrative ground, common 
practices, and a story that connects persons. Stanley Hauerwas 
makes this point in Community of Character, his analysis of 
Richard Adams’s novel Watership Down.9 Similarly, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer considered it immoral to destroy the narrative 
ground of another,10 a point that undergirds Charles Taylor’s 
emphasis on narrative in Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity.11 Modernity, on the other hand, undercuts 
narrative ground in numerous ways, to the point of losing an 
external standard for judgment, a loss which then leads to an 
increasingly popular mode of decision-making in the West that 
MacIntyre terms “emotivism”—decision-making based upon 
personal preference alone.12
A common center contends with emotivism; it functions 
as a third, as an external standard of evaluation that calls 
members to account. Emotivism, on the other hand, is a 
decision-making method in the West that emerges from what 
I term the social disease of individualism. Alexis De Tocqueville 
published warnings about this disease in Democracy in America; 
he examined early life in this country and warned against 
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the myth of individualism that assumes that one can stand 
above the constraints of family, church, and friendships.13 He 
stated a preference for selfishness over individualism because 
selfishness necessitates taking into account other people as we 
navigate the social environment, even for our own benefit. 
De Tocqueville contended that only religion could possibly 
temper individualism; he offered the insight that when religion 
lost its import, individualism would trump. I contend that 
individualism is winning; individualism is the central social sin 
of the West, the sin that we export globally. 
Fr. Gittins’s conception of community dwells at the heart 
of his faith and his love of community within the diversity of 
social orders in the church. He reminds us that faith lives within 
culture and the practices of social life, practices that generate 
meaning-making systems. Practices within a culture functionally 
shape social reality. Faith, for Gittins, is not challenged by 
differing cultural positions, but rather textured, nourished, and 
enhanced by multiplicity of perspectives. Differing cultural 
perspectives function as diverse communicative backgrounds 
that enrich conceptual understanding of interpretive 
engagements, framing foreground activity, ideas, and decision-
making. My addition to the conversation thus far that centers 
on Buber, Bok, MacIntyre, and Taylor is a call to rethink 
what is background and foreground in a postmodern world of 
virtue and narrative contention. In such a moment, a common 
center of community can no longer be a taken-for-granted 
background; a common center must be nourished, supported, 
and witnessed to as a foreground public confession. Diverse 
cultural background engagements generate differences, as do 
the different understandings of multiple places, ideas, and 
communities. However, what gathers a single community is 
a publicly confessed common center that must remain at the 
foreground of attentiveness.  
Fr. Gittins ties his work to the spirituality of St. Jerome 
in the fourth century (circa 342–384). St. Jerome traveled 
widely, studying with the best of teachers as he enhanced his 
reputation as a scholar of the Scriptures, but St. Jerome also 
called for active concern for those relegated to the margins of 
the human condition. Akin to St. Jerome, Gittins reminds us 
that spirituality is not a form of belief structured to the point 
of reification; instead, he calls for the embodiment of faithful 
selves who engage in practices that practically assist God’s 
world. It is remembering the owner of existence that keeps our 
actions performed on behalf of something other than the self. 
Borrowing from the insights of Taylor, it is this demotion of the 
self that counters totalizing efforts to disenchant God’s world.14 
On a local note, this Spiritan campus of Duquesne University 
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of the Holy Spirit finds its performative identity within 
enchanted phrases, such as understanding this dwelling as a 
life-giving place, as a witness to the fact that the Spirit Gives 
Life. Such words are not mere slogans; they are performative 
practices, habits of the heart that infuse a place with a narrative 
common center—the Spirit that Gives Life. 
Fr. Gittins offers a position on culture that is otherwise than 
convention. He contends that failure to learn from one another 
destroys the integrity of a community, and consistent with my 
earlier comments, failure to learn from one another obliterates 
the common center of community with a dismissiveness that 
fails to permit love to trump over liking. Gittins suggests 
that we must not only know about social locations but also 
recognize their formative power in our own lives and the lives 
of others, permitting learning to emerge from Same and Other. 
Gittins reminds us of a body of faith where acknowledgment 
of differences in physical and emotional activities underscores 
the reality of sickness and health as culturally coded. Learning 
requires attentiveness to a world occupied by the Other who 
deserves respect—without confusing him/her or me as the 
center of faith. We are part of God’s community without 
being the sole focus; this perspective counters a therapeutic 
communication style in which the individual communicator 
becomes the sovereign propelled by emotivistic decision-making 
by personal preference. Gittins suggests that acknowledging 
contrasting attitudes toward issues of time and space wards 
off demands for a single manner of participation in God’s 
world. Ethnocentrism, as Fr. Gittins states, however, is a fact 
of life; we must engage it by learning from differences with the 
constructive hope that we can thereby continue to assist the 
common center of a given community. Ethnocentrism void of 
such responsiveness to learning is, in Gittins’s words, a cultural 
flaw or original sin; it is a utopia void of others. Gittins points 
to inclusion based on difference, reminding us that the way of 
the cross does not begin with the self, but with paths open to 
those in the margins. 
An intercultural project attentive to nourishing an 
international religious community is a life-long project; Gittins 
suggests that such communities are an essential part of the 
faith within this century. A personal faith situated within 
good intentions is insufficient. The art of learning requires 
attentiveness to difference, otherness, and openness to novel 
insights ever propelled by tenacious hope. Neither truth nor 
community is a commodity—both are performative actions 
played out within an enchanted world that belongs to God, 
not to a single perspective. Fr. Gittins calls for a faith that 
challenges within a spirit of grace open to the unexpected.  
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Gittins asserts that answers in this century do not reside in 
the extremes of individualism or tribalism. From the vantage 
point of the West, I return to MacIntyre and his warning about 
individualism. He contends that the world has witnessed the 
dangers of imperialism and totalitarianism as these movements 
have devastated the globe; however, we have yet to understand 
what individualism is doing to the destruction of our social lives 
together. The tacit power of individualism is a performative 
exemplar of what Hannah Arendt called a “banality of evil.”15 
Practically and socially, one must engage intercultural living 
as communal, eschewing the temptation of the monocultural. 
One must address the margins, even as one slowly works in 
the margins with the hope of gaining the trust of a different 
community home. The global church needs to be a place of 
inclusion without resorting to imposed assimilation, token 
inclusion, or radical takeovers. Such a faith invites a radical 
welcoming of new ideas, which can enhance, enrich, and assure 
an enduring common center for a community that is bigger 
than a provincial settler can encompass and more complex than 
surface observations of the novice. 
Fr. Gittins concludes with three statements. First, those 
committed to bringing bicultural perspectives to community 
must build a home that is a “home away from home.” Second, 
one must remember that such integrated communities emerge 
organically, and one must engage such participation with 
patience. Third, the twenty-first century demands that we 
rethink how we think. Gittins cites material from Rudy Wiebe, 
who wrote a book on a fictional Mennonite community, 
Peace Shall Destroy Many.16 The novel illuminates Fr. Gittins’s 
thoughtful illustrations of the dangers of monoculturalism, 
ethnocentrism, and a refusal to learn from difference. Such 
actions destroy a common center and move the word “peace” 
into the terminological matrix of ideological oppression. For 
Gittins, faith within the twenty-first century begins with a 
commitment to bicultural formations.
Fr. Gittins ends with a discussion of good actions that 
testify to the reality of grace in a light of dawn that dwells 
within the eyes of another. Gittins calls for witnessing to an 
enchanted world that is beyond oneself and requires internal 
dialogue that seeks to enhance a given common center within 
a community. I suggest that as we engage such learning, 
there is a narrow ridge that we must walk17—receptiveness to 
difference and protection of a common center. Life nourished 
by individualism has singular direction, but community 
lived within the unity of contraries of burden and joy from 
learning—witnessing to the common center of the Spirit that 
gives Life—offers tenacious hope for this Spiritan campus 
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as a home for those who labor, work, pray, and learn. Such 
a place brings hope when it seems too distant, calling forth 
life in and for weary bones. Unlike the call to a cosmopolitan 
world, Gittins offers a practical solution that begins with an 
internal dialogue informed by multiple cultures. He guides us 
with a tenacious hope that lives within a faith that embraces 
learning while refusing to forget the power of a faith-filled 
community with a common center nourished by an enchanted 
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